A Mechanism of Persistence: Political Development of the PRI
One explanation for the observed persistence in capacity can be traced to the process of political development of the PRI regime. In places where the path to political consolidation was cleared by the large negative shock brought about by the Great Depression, local political leaders would have been better able to bargain with the emerging national regime to their advantage.
These local bosses were attractive to the regime because of the control they exerted in their regions.
The PRI needed these alliances as it consolidated, because they provided political order in the regions. To those local leaders that were able to provide local order, the national regime could offer ample leeway to continue local extraction-reaping the benefits of local investments in capacityand access to higher office to the local leader's clique. This was part of a broader strategy pursued by the national PRI. As Gil-Mendieta and Schmidt (1996) note, [t] he network established by the generals in power, originated in the aftermath of the Mexican revolution, created the main political institution which helped recruit politicians for government and expanded the economic and political resources available to the network. This supported Mexico's corporatist political structure and political stability because it expanded the connections between politicians who belong to a wide array of institutions. In order to maintain a unique political power system, the network members developed a system of loyalties extended also to political institutions which created a transmission band with the society at large. (357) In exchange for their support to the national ruling coalition, consolidated bosses could have secured local extraction over the long term-using locally developed capacity-but also increased their ability to place themselves (or their allies) in high profile national positions.
To assess the conjecture of consolidation and increased access to national political influence, I Federal government cabinet members National-level legislators National-level legislators (2) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio, and the dependent variable measures the total years served by politicians born in each municipio. Municipios with haciendas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
analyze the access to national-level political office associated with each municipio for the period . This period spans from immediately after I measure state capacity outcomes, following the commodity shocks, to the end of president Luis Echeverría's term in 1976. Past analyses of the Mexican national political network suggest that a military-based sub-network (akin to a camarilla)
ruled from the revolution until Echeverría's term, replaced later by a finance-based sub-network (Gil-Mendieta and Schmidt 1996) . 1 This military-based sub-network had a regional approach to bringing the country's economic regions under the regime's control, by integrating local strongmen to expand its influence geographically.
I construct a geographic political access measure using Roderic Camp's political biographies, and focus on members of Congress and appointed high-ranking officials (members of the national cabinet, the attorney general, and Justices of the Supreme Court). I assign each politician to their place of birth, under the assumption that geographical origin is a reasonable indication of having close ties with the local political leadership. Finally, I add the number of years served in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (or in high-ranking appointments), aggregating to the municipio level. shocks following the Great Depression are associated with higher representation of a municipio in both appointed and elective high-ranking positions (albeit the latter is less precisely estimated).
The results provide evidence for one channel of persistence of the documented shorter-term effects of temporary landed elite weakness on state capacity. They also suggest the relevance of political geography as a determinant of the patterns of political recruitment during the PRI regime, beyond the social characteristics of individual politicians (e.g., Smith 1979; Camp 1995) .
1 While the military-based ruling coalition was not characterized by direct intervention of the military in national politics, its civilian leadership did rely on the support of the military for presidential bids (Camp 1992) .
B Descriptives
B.1 Crop Prices Before and After the Great Depression 
B.2 Descriptive Statistics

B.3 Crop Suitability and Present-Day Production
Crop suitability, available from FAO's Global Agro-Ecological Zones, is calculated using information about local climate, soil types, slope, and rainfall. This measure is constructed in several steps.
First, historical climate geo-spatial data are processed to create climatic indicators relevant for plant production, such as the duration of plant-growing periods, and the rate of water loss in different soil types. In a second step, maximum yields for each crop are estimated as a function of different agro-climatic regimes. These calculations are made using different assumptions about inputs in agricultural production. I use the low-input-level rain-fed crop suitability because it best reflects baseline suitability; that is, it measures production potential without considering endogenous production conditions related to irrigation investment decisions, and selection of varieties and input intensity.
In a third and fourth steps, potential yields for each crop are adjusted to climatic, soil, and slope constraints that reduce production. Finally, in a fifth step, all these elements are integrated and computed for each grid-cell with available information (local climate, soil types, slope, and rainfall).
The resulting crop suitability measure is, as expected, highly correlated with observed, present- Average low input level rain-fed wheat suitability (ton/ha, 1960-1990) Planted Area (%) = α + β*Suitability + ε β = 1.19; std. error = 0.15; p-value = 0.00; N = 2107 Wheat (a) Average low input level rain-fed maize suitability (ton/ha, 1960-1990) Planted Area (%) = α + β*Suitability + ε β = 0.11; std. error = 0.12; p-value = 0.36; N = 2107 Average low input level rain-fed banana suitability (ton/ha, 1960-1990) Planted Area (%) = α + β*Suitability + ε β = 0.98; std. error = 0.21; p-value = 0.00; N = 2107 Banana (e) Share of planted area among the selected crops: Wheat, maize, sugarcane, rice, and banana. Data from SIAP and GAEZ. Average low input level rain-fed coffee suitability (ton/ha, 1960-1990) Planted Area (%) = α + β*Suitability + ε β = 1.17; std. error = 0.64; p-value = 0.07; N = 2107 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .10,
Data from SIAP and GAEZ. Table B .4: Crop Suitability (1961 -1990 and Present-Day Production (2013) Production (log tonnes)
(5) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Data from SIAP and GAEZ.
B.4 Commodity Potential Over Time
Commodity potential is defined as:
whereP gt is the average price of crop g in time t ∈ {1920s, 1930s}; Suitability ig is a municipiospecific crop suitability measure (in metric tonnes) determined by agro-climatic conditions; and
Suitability ig is a national average.
Commodity potential can vary between municipios at any given point in time because of differences in their crop suitability-their ability to grow certain crops given the local agro-climatic conditions. Higher suitability to grow crops, relative to the national average, will lead to higher commodity potential. These characteristics are exogenous, and do not vary over time (see section B.3 for a detailed description of crop suitability). Prices do change, which makes it possible that commodity potential vary over time for a given municipio. Increasing prices for the basket of crops leads to higher values ofV it .
In short, commodity potential aggregates the value of the potential production of a municipio at a given point in time relative to the rest of the country. This measure is directly related to the availability of resources for the landed elite, who produce commodities for the market. A high commodity potential suggests abundant available resources in a municipio, relative to others. These resources can be transformed by the elite into political power, which enables them to challenge the local political leaders. A large, temporary decline in economic resources reduces the elite's political power, and with it their ability to defeat the ruler. This temporary shock, according to the theory, has two related effects: first, rulers seize upon this opportunity to eliminate the source of power of the elite-by expropriating their land; second, they have enhanced incentives to invest in state capacity, which they will likely enjoy in the future now that they are relatively more secure in power. for two groups of miunicipios: those that were most-and least-shocked by the Great Depression.
The lines show how commodity potential aggregates the production potential (via suitability) and prices for all crops, and how it shifts over time as prices change. C Additional Empirical Analysis C.1 Alternative Measures: Difference-in-differences Design (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Standard errors (clustered at the municipio level) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. (2) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio. Municipios with haciendas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
C.3 Evidence of Pre-Depression Parallel Trends
An important assumption for a causal interpretation of the effect of shocks to commodity potential is that, in the absence of the shock, affected and unaffected places would have followed parallel trends in terms of bureaucrats and land redistribution. This assumption, while untestable, implies that, prior to the shock, trends should be parallel between relatively affected and unaffected municipios.
In table C.5, I directly assess whether the shock to commodity potential (from 1930 to 1940) predicts pre-Depression changes in bureaucrats (from 1900 to 1930) and land redistribution (from 1920 to 1930) . If this were the case, then the parallel trends assumption would be violated in the pre-Depression period.
The results confirm the pattern illustrated by the figure 4. In no case is commodity potential significantly associated with the pre-Depression outcomes. Furthermore, the estimated conditional correlations are much smaller than the actual effects (presented in columns 1-2 and 5-6 for reference), and close to zero. (1) for the econometric specification. Jurisdictions or municipios with haciendas. In models 1-4, the yearly unit-of-analysis is the smallest jurisdiction in which the municipios of 1900 and 1940 completely overlap. This spatial aggregation results in 1,547 artificial jurisdictions, of which 1,235 had at least an hacienda in 1930. In models 5-8, the unit-ofanalysis is the municipio-year. Standard errors (clustered at the jurisdiction level in models 1-4 and at the municipio level in models 5-8) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
C.4 Spatial Correlation of Errors
Given the nature of crop suitabilities, spatial clustering may affect the validity of the results. The
Moran's I statistics for the residuals of the estimated models from equation (1) To further explore the nature of the spatial autocorrelation of the residuals, I present in figure C.1 the spatial correlograms of the residuals for both outcomes. The figure presents the spatial correlation of residuals as distance between municipio dyads increases up to roughly 3,300km, the maximum distance between municipio dyads in Mexico. These correlations suggest a similar conclusion as the global Moran's I above: there is no discernible pattern of spatial correlation in residuals from the model on bureaucrats, and a small but visible one for the model on land redistribution. Specifically, the residuals of municipios that are close are positively correlated, a pattern that is reversed at around the 400km mark. After 1,200km, the spatial autocorrelation is no longer significant.
I use these insights to re-estimate tables 1 and 2, assuming serial correlation within municipioequivalent to clustering at the municipio level-as well as spatial correlation in equation (1)'s errors between municipios that are within 1,200 km of one another. The variance-covariance matrix is estimated using an approach described in Conley (2008) and Hsiang (2010) . These estimations are presented in tables C.6 and C.7 below. The main results are unchanged by making these alternative assumptions about the distribution of the errors in equation (1). The figures present the spatial correlation between residuals as distance between municipios increases up to the maximum distance in Mexico. The upper panel uses the residuals of the fully specified model for the number of bureaucrats (column 2 in table 1) and the lower panel uses the residuals from a model for land redistribution (column 2 in table 2). The histogram presents the distribution of the number of municipio dyads by distance. (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Standard errors (that assume serial correlation within municipios and spatial correlation between municipios within 1,200 km from each other) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Standard errors (that assume serial correlation within municipios and spatial correlation between municipios within 1,200 km from each other) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
C.5 Alternative Estimation Strategies
To further assess the robustness of the results, in tables C.8 and C.9 I implement two alternative estimation strategies to the main difference-in-differences approach.
First, I follow an estimation strategy based on selection on observables, presented in columns 1-4 of both tables. To be able to match between two groups (i.e., treatment and control), I first identify municipios that were negatively shocked above average between 1930 and 1940, and municipios that were negatively shocked below average over the same period. I then find weights that match the mean of predetermined observables between these two groups. I find these weights using a method described in Hainmueller (2012) 
As tables C.8 and C.9 show, the results are largely robust to these estimation strategies. The coefficients for commodity potential are negative and of comparable magnitude to the baseline difference-in-difference estimation for both bureaucrats and land redistribution (though the estimate for bureaucrats in a model without controls is not precisely estimated). A shock variable that indicates whether a municipio was hit by the Great Depression harder than average also re-veals a qualitatively similar negative effect. Finally the lagged dependent variable model reveals similar results with the inclusion of the pre-determined controls (but no effect of the shock in the specification without controls). (1) for the econometric specification of columns 1-4, and equation (A3) for the estimating equation of columns 5-6. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Municipios with haciendas. Standard errors (clustered at the municipio level in columns 1-4, and robust in columns 5-6) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. (1) for the econometric specification of columns 1-4, and equation (A3) for the estimating equation of columns 5-6. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Municipios with haciendas. Standard errors (clustered at the municipio level in columns 1-4, and robust in columns 5-6) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
C.6 Exclusion of Commodity Potential in Cross-sectional Design
Initial commodity potential, in levels (lnV 1920s i ), can be plausibly correlated with unobservables, which themselves may be associated with any of the outcomes that I consider (local bureaucrats and land redistribution by 1940, or long-term outcomes). That alone would bias the estimate of initial commodity potential (β 0 from equation 2). However, if initial commodity potential is additionally correlated with the commodity shock (S 1920s−30s i ), then the main estimate of interest,β 1 , will be biased as well.
The commodity shock, however, is driven by exogenous changes in international commodity prices, and is not correlated with initial (1920s) commodity potential (the correlation coefficient is 0.0056 in places with haciendas, and statistically indistinguishable from zero.) This suggests that the inclusion/exclusion of initial commodity potential should not affect the results. I verify that this is the case by re-estimating the cross-sectional models in tables C.10 and C.11, which exclude initial commodity potential, both for contemporary changes in local bureaucrats and for long term outcomes. In both the short-and long-term models, the results are substantively unchanged by the exclusion of initial commodity potential. (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipio-year. Standard errors (clustered at the municipio level) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the municipioyear. Standard errors (clustered at the municipio level) in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
